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Abstract 
Narrative reporting has been identified as potentially playing one of two contrasting 
rather than complementary roles: incremental information (II) and impression 
management (IM). II denotes the disclosure of information needed to help in investors’ 
decision-making, whilst IM relates to its selective use in enhancing reputation or 
protecting from criticism. They can be linked with, but are not confined to, Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR). The paper examines the use of narrative reporting by 
British Petroleum (BP) and Shell during two significant crises, the Iranian 
nationalisation of oil supplies (1950-51) and the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal (1956-7). The impact of these differed for the two companies because of the 
importance to each of Iran and of oil supplies from the Eastern Hemisphere. An 
analysis of their disclosure suggests that both, in different ways, varied their narrative 
in response to the threats presented by the two episodes, and that there is scope for 
further investigation of this form of reporting. 
Nationalisation: oil industry: financial reporting: impression management: investor 
information 
Keywords: Impression management, narrative reporting, crises, oil industry 
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1. Introduction 
Fooks et al (2013) investigate reporting behaviour adopted by British American Tobacco in 
the 1990s in the face of increasingly powerful regulatory and lobby groups opposed to 
tobacco. Their paper lists practices identified by other researchers that illustrate how 
corporate narrative reporting might deal with external threats or mitigate the reaction to 
internal failures. "Neutralization" is the contradiction or deflection of criticism, "stakeholder 
management" the attempts to consolidate support from those whose support the company 
needs, and "political CSR" the deployment of CSR themes to enhance corporate status and 
power.  Where Fooks et al categorise this behaviour as CSR, others have described it in more 
general and inclusive terms, such as "impression management" (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 
2007): for critical commentators it is "the construction of legitimacy" (Ogden and Clarke, 
2005) or "societal alignment" strategy (Yang and Malone, 2008).  These descriptions include 
the use of CSR issues, but extend to the corporate policies to mitigate the effects of exposure 
to financial or political instability.  
The studies cited above are some of the numerous investigations of uses of narrative 
reporting in the late 20th/early 21st centuries: for instance Guillamon-Saorin et al (2012) on 
listed Spanish companies, Yang and Malone (2008) on Philip Morris 1999-2004, Ogden and 
Clarke (2005) on privatised UK water companies after 1990, Craig and Amernic (2004) on 
Enron before its 2001 collapse. Less attention has been given to earlier uses of such reporting 
and their deployment to manage readers' views of corporate reputation. The present paper is 
an attempt to widen the understanding of the role played historically by narrative reporting. It 
considers two companies in a period of crisis, Shell and BP, during the 1950s, when their 
stability was threatened to varying degrees by two events: the Iranian nationalisation of the 
country’s oil facilities and the Egyptian closure of the Suez Canal. This paper compares the 
responses of the two companies because of the different degrees of impact which they 
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recognised, and the possibility of both comparing and contrasting their reports in two well-
defined periods of crisis. 
Although both crises have attracted substantial interest from business and economic 
historians, some of which has addressed CSR issues (for example Abdelrehim et al. 2011), 
their implications for financial reporting have attracted less attention This paper considers the 
ways in which the crises impacted on financial reporting by looking at the companies’ 
narrative disclosures at AGMs and in financial statements over the period affected, from 1950 
to 1958, when the oil industry was exposed to challenges to its supply network and to 
criticisms of its behaviour. It considers how narrative reporting was used to respond to the 
crises, and to manage the companies’ interests with important stakeholders, and how the two 
companies’ choices in reporting reflected similarities and differences in their concerns. The  
companies’ responses to the Iranian and Suez crises offer, it is argued, an opportunity to 
understand the extent to which disclosures at a time of emergency are made with a view to 
corporate reputation management. CSR is often viewed as a mechanism for building 
corporate reputation (Toms, 2002: Hasseldine et al 2005) but when faced with wider threats 
to that reputation, firms’ narrative disclosures need to go beyond CSR, and may need to do so 
for some time, depending on the nature of the crisis Is narrative reporting provided on a 
continuing basis to keep users aware of corporate behaviour (II) or is it deployed by the 
company to defend itself at times of crisis (the IM interpretation)? IM and II are not 
necessarily limited to CSR/environmental/social disclosures. . Our study suggests that there is 
scope for examination of both current and historical reporting which admits the possibility 
that narrative material is used not necessarily as a CSR but as a form of reputation 
management. . Heflin and Wallace (2011) have identified a factor to which this paper will 
return: the relevance of timing to an understanding of the II/IM distinction. 
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In the next part of the paper, we address the historical context of BP and Shell, exploring 
their origins, development and their international status in the 1950s. This is followed by a 
section exploring the significance of the Iranian and Egyptian nationalisation crises, which 
we argue were in different ways significant for the two companies, given the resources that 
each had at its disposal and the extent of its reliance on Middle Eastern oil. The paper then 
offers a content analysis of relevant disclosures from their reports during the period of 1950-
1958. We use material from the press reporting of annual general meetings (AGMs) and from 
the publicly available annual reports produced by BP and Shell, to consider the extent to 
which the companies used narrative during the years affected by the crisis. In particular, we 
are interested in the companies’ discussion of their performance as international employers 
and of their future prospects. We compare the choice of themes and the rhetoric used, and 
also their adoption of particular methods of disclosure, and relate these features to the 
companies’ situation and resources. A final section draws conclusions and considers the 
potential for further work. 
 
2. Reporting and "the illusion of righteousness" 
Jones (2011, p.76) emphasises that a “particularly interesting aspect of the extant body of 
research into corporate disclosure using graphs is the discovery of apparent widespread 
impression management” By this he means that management presents information to give a 
“more favourable impression of a company’s activities than is actually warranted by the 
company’s performance” (Jones, 2011, p.76). For Davison (2014), the images may be 
"transparent carriers of intended organisational messages" or they may "play a role". It is 
possible to deploy images with either objective, and the same image may bear different 
interpretations. A chart or graph of performance may look like a reassuringly objective 
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statement of information, or may be used to emphasise a positive aspect of performance and 
distract attention from a negative result.  
   
The narratives are discretionary not only in their content, timing, style and audience but also 
because they represent a variety of choices made by the company about their function. For 
Samkin and Schneider (2010), impression management enables reporting entities to manage 
their image. Samkin and Schneider (2010, p.264) highlight that impression management is an 
“organised communication, which is controlled and managed, influential and persuasive. As 
such, it could be usefully employed, by reporting entities, undertaking legitimating 
activities”. Merkl-Davies and Brennan, in their 2007 study of narrative reporting, offer a 
number of important categories in analysing the use made of it by companies. Their leading 
category is the distinction between narrative as impression management, as argued by 
researchers who assume "that managerial discretionary disclosure choices are opportunistic", 
or as incremental information, "the provision of value-relevant information aimed at 
improving investor decision making" (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007, p.8). These 
classifications are important. The view of narrative as incremental information (II) is a 
positive one: proponents of this view treat it as supplying investors and others with additional 
data that will be relevant to their decision-making. Impression management (IM) denotes a 
negative view, typified by Ogden and Clarke's description of it - "a means of portraying 
organizational structures and actions in ways which are intended to secure endorsement and 
support"(2005, p. 314).  
Brennan and Merkl-Davies identify three major kinds of "asset" which companies may seek 
to protect via narrative reporting: image, reputation and legitimacy.  Image denotes individual 
aspects of the company such as "market image" or "investment image" and so can be related 
to particular types of behaviour. Reputation is concerned with its general status, touching on 
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all aspects, whilst legitimacy denotes “the normative appropriateness of organization”.. They 
argue that “corporate scandals involving a breach of law (e.g., tax evasion, corporate fraud) 
or a violation of social norms and rules (e.g., environmental disasters or human rights 
violations in Third World countries) can be regarded as damaging organizational 
legitimacy"(2013, p. 6).  In a similar vein, Samkin and Schneider  (2010, p.257) argue that to 
achieve legitimacy, “ management makes use of impression management techniques within 
the annual report to portray the entity and its actions in the most favourable way possible to 
ensure the ongoing support of stakeholders”. There are thus a variety of situations where the 
company may wish to deploy narrative reporting and a variety of interpretations that may be 
put on its use. Is it to be seen as the release of information that supplements what is already 
available in the market, or as an attempt to counteract this at times of crisis? 
The opposition of motives for II and IM suggests the importance of a contrast in managerial 
reporting behaviour, identified by Heflin and Wallace (2011, p.2-3):  
The incremental information view assumes management's voluntary disclosures provide 
relevant information aimed at improving investor decision making... (so that) better 
environmental performers make more extensive environmental disclosures to distinguish 
themselves from poorer environmental performers. Impression management research 
assumes management's voluntary disclosures represent an attempt to manipulate and manage 
the impression... (so that) poor environmental performers provide more environmental 
disclosures than better performers to create the impression of environmental 
concern.  (Emphases added). 
In other words, the categories of impression management are either assertive or defensive 
(Samkin and Schneider, 2010). Assertive impression management techniques are used when 
management may disclose extensively because its behaviour is likely to be viewed positively. 
This suggests that it will report on actions on a continuing basis. Whereas defensive 
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impression management techniques are used to neutralise criticism and counter a risk or a 
challenge, which suggests that particular disclosures may be deployed only when needed, 
rather than consistently over time (Samkin and Schneider, 2010).  This opposition is an 
important one which will be discussed later in the paper as part of its review of the reporting 
done by the two companies in the crises of the 1950s. 
Brennan and Merkl-Davies point to two significant groups of researchers" views of IM/II. 
They draw a contrast between those who take  a  "narrow view", seeing narrative reporting as 
concerned largely with financial relationships, so that it is reporting aimed at the market, and 
a view which is directed towards the "wider socio-political context in which corporate 
reporting takes place" (2013, p.12) 
Does this wider view imply that II/IM can be equated with CSR?  There are certainly aspects 
that they have in common.   Emerging explanations for CSR reporting suggest (Friedman and 
Miles, 2001; Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005) that it can be conceived as both an 
outcome of and part of reputation risk management processes. CSR disclosures in financial 
reporting have been argued to be important in understanding the way managers respond to the 
crises and defend their existence. Parker (1986, p. 76) notes that “social disclosure can act as 
an early response to impending legislative pressure for increased disclosure and as a counter 
to possible government intervention or pressure from other outside interest groups”, an 
assertion echoed by Unerman, 2003. Adams & Harte (1998) and Gray et al. (1995) have 
viewed disclosures in financial reporting as used by capitalist elites to protect and advance 
their sectional interests. But the identification of "assets" by Merkl and Davies outlined above 
is a reminder that corporate interest may not be restricted to its reporting of social concerns 
and care for the environment. The need to protect reputation and legitimacy invokes a wider 
set of issues, to do with corporate power, political activity and influence and corporate 
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compliance with social norms. Narrative reporting, we argue, does not necessarily equate to 
CSR. 
Yoon and Lam (2013, p.630) use the phrase quoted above to discuss the recent behaviour of 
the alcohol industry in attempts to establish alcohol companies as "good corporate citizens". 
The "illusion" can take a number of forms, addressed to different audiences. Brennan and 
Merkl-Davies subsume these when discussing the process of using what they describe as 
"discretionary accounting narratives" for "aligning firm norms and values with those of 
society, particularly in situations where firms face legitimacy threats, such as corporate 
scandals, product safety issues or environmental disasters"(2013, p.109). 
These reports are specifically narratives- i.e. they are not part of the companies’ quantitative 
accounting data or the accounting policies used in disclosure. They are discretionary because 
they exceed the minimum legal requirement of a set of financial statements. Some of the 
"narrative" may be disclosed within these reports; other parts of it may feature in the 
chairman's AGM address, in press releases, advertising and other media. Graphic material - 
charts, maps and photographs -can play a significant part in the work done by the narrative 
(Davison and Warren, 2009). For Jones (2011, p. 75), graphs represent an important 
corporate reporting information format “and can be used by companies to synthesise and 
display information to readers in an easily digestible way”.  For Campbell et al. (2009, p. 
910), graphics in reports have a "non-trivial function", as they are "an important part of the 
overall rhetoric or discourse ...and ...support the truth claims" made elsewhere in the 
narrative. The use of material and the choice of images will help to reinforce the claim made.  
This paper will look at BP and Shell's narrative reporting in the wider context identified by 
Merkl-Davies and Brennan, considering not only financial image but the extent to which the 
companies deal with their reputation and legitimacy. Some of this reporting may reasonably 
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be described as CSR, but it will, we argue, relate also to a wider range of issues that arise as a 
result of international political and economic crisis.  
Our interest is in particular with the identification of narrative as IM rather than II. Was the 
companies’ use of narrative a defensive response to crisis, intended to deflect criticism and 
recruit support, or was it a continuing process of briefing investors with a steady supply of 
relevant information? The discussion of IM/II definitions outlined above suggests a lack of 
clarity among researchers in distinguishing between them. Our study therefore has potential 
for distinguishing between the use of narrative to inform, and to shape opinion, considering 
the kinds of information deployed and the events which may elicit such disclosure.  
 
3. Historical Background  
The Iranian crisis 
Parra (2005, p. 1) describes the 20th Century history of oil as one of “uneasy relationship 
between foreign investors (the oil companies) and the host governments intermingled with 
the strategic interests of the major industrial powers, mainly the US and Britain, (that) were 
punctuated by localized breakdowns”.  BP (51% owned by the British government from 1914 
onwards) and Shell (40 % British-owned) were prominent among the major international 
companies of the world. Together with Gulf Oil, Texaco, Standard Oil of New Jersey 
Esso and Standard Oil Company of New York they made up the group known as the Seven 
Sisters which dominated the oil industry from the 1950s to the 1980s. 
BP's commitment to (and dependence on) operations in Iran began with its discovery in Iran 
in 1908 of the enormous Bakhtiari oilfield, for which the company was granted a 60-year 
concession by the Shah. The concession's long life and the control it gave over Iran's known 
oil supplies gave it enormous benefits which it exploited to the full - it “reigned supreme” 
(Parra, 2005, p. 7). Iran received royalties and tax, but otherwise BP controlled the operation 
11 
 
and enjoyed its benefits. BP was viewed as a major British asset, described by Churchill as 
crucial for “national prosperity in peace and our safety in war” (Longhurst, 1959, p.6).  
A 1933 renegotiation of the original 1908 agreement improved the benefits to Iran, which 
was to receive an increase in the royalty it received, comprising a fixed sum of 4s per ton, a 
guaranteed 20 per cent of worldwide profits above a fixed level and a minimum annual 
payment of £750,000 (Esfahani and Pesaran, 2008; Yergin, 1993, p.271).  
BP also embarked on a policy of improving employment conditions for Iranian workers, and 
reducing its employment of foreigners, but there was still evidence of poor housing, low 
wages and lack of opportunity for Iranians (Kinzer, 2008, p. 77).  In 1947, the Iranian 
government began another attempt to improve both the financial terms of the agreement and 
the treatment of Iranian workers. Long negotiations produced a 1949 Supplemental 
Agreement, but this was never agreed by the Iranian Majlis (Parliament). The secular 
nationalist party under Mussadiq allied with the Communists in opposing it on the basis that 
its new terms still left Iran at a disadvantage. In 1951 Mussadiq's government nationalised the 
company’s assets in Iran. UK and US negotiations and a case brought to the International 
Court of Justice at The Hague did not improve BP's position, but in 1952 the US supported a 
coup in favour of the deposed Shah of Iran. This was followed by a new agreement. The 
former BP assets were controlled by a consortium of which BP was a member, whose profits 
were shared 50:50 with the Iranian government. As White (2000) highlighted, no imperial 
business leader could have failed to observe the Iranian nationalisation in 1951 as an example 
of worldwide failure of British governments to protect commercial interests from the 
predatory instincts of determined post-war economic nationalists . 
The Suez crisis 
The Shell structure was that of a group with two parent companies (Penrose, 1975), one 
British registered and mostly owned by British shareholders - Shell Transport and Trading 
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Company, (Shell)- and the other Dutch registered, the Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company,  receiving the income from the Group in Royal Dutch's favour on a 60:40 basis. 
Shell differed from BP in that its oil was more widely sourced: in 1957, for instance, it 
reported that “one-fifth of our crude oil supplies were produced in the United States,  two-
fifths in Venezuela and one-quarter in countries of the Middle East” (The Financial Times , 
Thursday, May 30, 1957). This had implications for its response both to the Iran crisis of 
1951 and the 1956 nationalisation of the Suez Canal. 
The Suez Canal, built 1854-1869, was operated as a company owned by French and British 
investors. The British government acquired 44% of the voting shares. Because of its crucial 
situation as a link connecting the Middle and Far East with the Mediterranean, the Canal held 
an important place in both the mythology and practicalities of empire-its defence, imperial 
and commonwealth trading links, and passenger routes" seen post-1945 as “a vital base 
against possible communist expansion or attack” (Onslow, 2003, p.22). In 1955, the 
Americans in conjunction with the British and the World Bank considered a loan to Egypt to 
build a huge Dam at Aswan on the Nile but in July 1956, the proposed loan was cancelled as 
result of opposition in the US: it was then that Nasser announced his decision to nationalise 
the Suez Canal and use the tolls from the canal in financing the Aswan Dam. He explained 
that although the oil producing countries received 50 % of the profits from their oil, Egypt 
did not get 50% of the profits from the Canal with most of its earnings derived from tolls 
going to European shareholders, including the largest shareholder of all, the British 
government (Yergin, 1993, p. 463). Under nationalisation, Egypt took over all assets, rights 
and obligations of the company and created an independent Egyptian agency to operate the 
Canal. 
Suez Canal nationalisation caused massive dislocation of oil supplies, particularly to Europe, 
while tankers were being re-routed and supply sources re-arranged.  It was intensified for 
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British companies by the Government's reluctance to provide them with the foreign exchange 
needed to pay transit fees. The continuing difficulties over purchasing oil supplies from the 
Eastern Hemisphere affected not only the company but also Western Europe as a whole. 
Nationalisation of the Suez Canal was greeted with panic. With the loss of the canal, Europe 
faced an energy crisis with oil shortages of nearly 2 million barrels per day (Kapstein, 1990, 
p.118). According to Bamberg “no event in the post-war years exposed more starkly the 
decline in Britain's power and Western Europe's growing dependence on Middle East oil than 
the Suez Canal crisis which broke out in 1956” (Bamberg, 2000, p.75). BP commented that 
"President Nasser's action has brought to the forefront, in an ugly and unexpected form in all 
Western European countries, their great and growing dependence on Middle East oil, the 
assured supply of which is again, as in 1951 at the time of the Persian oil dispute, brought 
into question" (Petroleum Press Service, 1956). It was not only a threat to oil supplies but 
also a warning of lost political control: the British Prime Minister Eden was concerned to 
keep the canal area safeguarded even by military action as “failure to keep the canal 
international would inevitably lead to the loss one by one of (British) interests and assets in 
the Middle East” (Bowie, 1974, p.21). The French saw Nasser as a threat to their position in 
North Africa and therefore were strongly motivated toward military intervention. The two 
governments opened a military dialogue with the Israelis who had similar interests for 
striking at Nasser. Eden believed that if force had to be used against Nasser, it was better to 
use it immediately than later. The result was the tripartite (English/French/Israeli) invasion of 
the Egypt which took place in October and November 1956, halted finally by UN 
intervention. 
Before the closure, almost 30% of British oil supplies were transported through the canal, the 
cheapest way to transport British oil supplies from the Middle East. After nationalisation of 
the canal, tankers had to ship supplies around the Cape which caused freight rates to rise. BP 
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was badly affected by expensive charter rates, whilst Shell, over- supplied at the time with 
tankers, had fewer extra costs (Klantsching, 2003). In the Iranian crisis, a single company, 
BP, faced a direct challenge to a substantial proportion of its assets. Shell was not directly 
affected, but its response, as discussed below, suggests its awareness of the potential threat to 
itself and to other oil companies from similar actions elsewhere in the world. At the time of 
Suez, BP was again seriously impacted because of its continuing (though reduced) level of 
reliance on Eastern Hemisphere oil carried through the Canal.   Many other oil companies 
were potentially threatened by the seizure of the Canal, an infrastructure asset that allowed 
them to function efficiently. Shell's controlling interest in the Suez Canal Company meant 
that, of these firms, it was the most directly affected.  The problems created for the two 
companies thus varied, reflecting the extent of their dependence on the resources of the two 
countries: but they both had certain common concerns that, we argue, affected their financial 
reporting 
 
4. Content analysis:  Data capture and analysis 
The content analysis compares 2 sets of data: the annual reports of BP and Shell during the 
periods (1950-1958) likely to have been affected by the Iranian and Suez crises.  This section 
of the paper briefly describes the sources of this data and the method used to analyse them. 
To record and analyse the data collected from the company's annual reports, a database was 
set up based upon the Page proportions for each piece of information. 
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The companies’ reporting of the issues 
This section of the paper reviews evidence of the attempts made by BP and Shell to use 
financial reporting in response to the threats presented by the Iranian and Egyptian crises, 
from 1950 to 1958.  
Appendix 2 provides an analysis of the page length of the companies’ annual reports over the 
period. For each company we summarise the total page length of the report, and the number 
of pages covering the crisis. We also consider the amount of space given to disclosures about 
the each company’s performance as employers, in particular as international employers. How 
far did they respond to claims of mistreatment and hostility by presenting themselves as 
concerned for workers" well-being and positive relationships worldwide? In addition to these 
two themes, we examine the use of graphic material: was this deployed at times of crisis to 
support the rhetoric of the narrative reporting? 
 
Comparative disclosures during and after the Iranian crisis (1950-1958)  
This section of the paper reviews evidence of the attempts made by BP and Shell to use 
financial reporting in response to the threats presented by the Iranian and Egyptian crises, 
from 1950 to 1958. The comparative disclosures establish a data set from which some 
insights into the explanations into disclosures could be made. The purpose of this 
comparative analysis is explicitly to provide some insight into the causes of changes and 
demonstrate how IM by the chairman of the company is associated with more transient 
disclosures (especially where there is an external trigger for such disclosures) during two 
different episodes 
BP disclosures during Iranian crisis   
As noted above, Iranian nationalisation was an event which affected BP severely in 1950 and 
1951.  Its reporting in this period included extensive coverage of its relationship with Iran. 
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The 1950 report appeared in December 1951, substantially delayed by the nationalisation 
crisis. It was more than 11,000 words long, the majority devoted to a detailed account of the 
company’s relationship and negotiations with Iran from the beginning of the century. The 
headlines of the AGM report in The Economist (1 December 1951) summed up the content: 
First Full Statement of Developments in Iran 
Undertakings of 1933 Convention Broken by Iranian Government 
Denial of False Charges Made Against Company 
Expansion of Widespread Interests outside Iran 
Sir William Fraser's Reassurance to Shareholders 
The company stressed at length its “status and rights in Iran have been seriously affected, first 
by the law promulgated in Iran on 1st May 1951….of the nationalisation of the oil industry 
throughout the country; and secondly by the steps subsequently taken by the Imperial Iranian 
government” (BP 1950 annual report, p. 11). BP claimed that the Iranian Government had 
departed from freely made agreements, with no international support for its behaviour, and 
emphasised throughout that its actions had the support of the British Government. Similar 
themes reappeared in the 1951 report where the chairman described that the course of events 
had so gravely injured the company's  interests in Iran and then explained that the British 
Government “had instituted proceedings in May 1951 before the International Court of 
Justice at the Hague, on the ground that the company British national had been treated in a 
manner not in accordance with the principles of international law, and that there existed a 
dispute between the two governments” ( BP 1951 annual report, p.16). A further section in 
the 1950 annual report argued that higher royalty payments to Iranian government which 
would have a negative impact on the company competitiveness (BP 1950 annual report, 
p.12). It is worth noting that despite the negative consequences of nationalisation, the 
chairman statement in 1950 discussed the important developments by the company following 
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the loss of Iranian supplies to reassure stakeholders that there had been no serious disruptions 
to oil supplies.  
Following 1950, there was a noted decline in the reference to the Iranian crisis post 
nationalisation (as shown in Figure 1). In 1952, BP again briefly discussed the post-1950 
situation: the chairman mentioned that 1952 "was the first full year during which the 
company had no oil production from Iran and the effect of this deprivation on the business, 
despite the greatly increased supplies which the company obtained from other sources is 
reflected in the reduction in AIOC trading profits” (BP 1952 annual report, p.14).   BP 
emphasised that “Her Majesty's Government” and the company were at one in their defence 
of BP against unjust Iranian behaviour.  BP emphasised that it had been "dispossessed of its 
property, rights and interests in Iran, thereby suffering grievous losses” (BP 1952 annual 
report, p.19).  The report for 1953 briefly covered the period of the US-backed coup in Iran. 
After briefly referring to the Iranian “change of government" BP emphasised that the British 
Government had been operating in “close consultation with the company”, negotiating "on 
their own behalf and that of the company” (BP 1953 annual report, p.18). Again, this was 
stressing mutual support: the company endorsed the British Government, and the 
Government recognised that BP was entitled to full compensation for the loss of assets 
legally held in Iran.  
<< Insert Figures 1& 2 here >> 
 
BP’ s reporting emphasised claims of the equality of conditions which it offered to Iranian 
and British staff working in the same grades during the crisis. As shown in Figure 2, the 
employment-issue disclosures increased in the 1950 report which stated that the company 
had “carried out a vast expansion of the social services for its tens of thousands of employees 
in Iran, 94% Iranian nationals, whose numbers had been greatly increased” (BP 1950 annual 
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report, p. 12), quoting a total of £39,000,000 spent on such provision. Furthermore, the 
company stressed that its policy "has always been to encourage the spirit of amity and 
partnership between members of the British staff and Iranian staff” and emphasised that 
“equality of treatment in the widest sense, was meted out to all of equal status irrespective of 
nationality" (BP 1950 annual report, p.22).  As shown in Figure 2, after the resolution of the 
Iranian crisis, the 1952-1955 reports did not mention or disclose any information about the 
social services/medical care or housing. 
 
It is worth noting that the lengths of the reports in pages rose substantially during the Iran 
crisis:  from 23 pages in 1949 to 30pp and then 33pp in 1950 and 1951.  Length fell again 
post-crisis from 28 in 1952 to 24 in 1954. In reference to the physical and aesthetic 
presentation of BP reports, it was noticeable that there was a change in the presentation of the 
reports themselves. For instance, in addition to the extensive discussion of Iran and of 
employee welfare, graphic material made up some of the increase. In 1949 there had been 3 
pages of photographs and 1 table of analysis for (1949 and1948) oil production, refinery 
throughput and sales of refined products. In 1950, there was a substantial increase in length 
which was devoted to the detailed discussion of BP's relationship with Iran. As shown in 
Figure 3, the graphic content of the report increased to 13 pages in 1951. There were 
photographs of drilling and refining activity, of tanker fleets, and of a royal visit to BP's 
refinery, pictures reinforcing a view of a commercially active company, commanding 
valuable assets and enjoying high status. The amount of graphic material reduced in 1952 as 
the crisis was reduced, with 7 photos and a chart: by 1954, as the company returned to secure 
profitable activity, no graphics appeared, 
<< Insert Figure 3 here >> 
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Shell disclosures during Iranian crisis 
Shell's 1950 report appeared very shortly after the outbreak of the Iran crisis - too soon for 
the company to comment on it there. As illustrated in Figure 1, Shell's reference to the 
Iranian crisis increased in 1951 where the chairman of Shell stressed that “all members of the 
industry” recognised the seriousness of the Iranian situation: "Failure on the part of 
Governments to respect solemn obligations is a new phenomenon which must reflect 
disastrously on those who practise it” (Shell 1951 annual report, p.14). On a similar theme, in 
Shell's chairman's statement, reference was made to the problems arising from the loss of 
supplies from Iran and the difficulty of finding alternative supplies continues to be dealt with 
by the concerned action of the British and American Industry Committees (Shell 1951 annual 
report, p.14).  
As the case of BP, there was a noted decline in the reference to the Iranian crisis post 
nationalisation. For instance, in 1952, there was no direct mention of Iran, but the report 
included the statement that “in all the countries in which we operate there is a fundamental 
identity of interests between the Governments concerned and the enterprise of our 
companies’ (Shell 1952 annual report, p.12). The implication was not only that Shell 
depended on the good will of host countries, but that the countries" welfare would depend on 
the relationship with Shell, a tacit reference to the Iranian issue.  This is not as specific a 
discussion of the situation as that produced by BP, but evokes the reference by Fooks et al 
(2013, p. 292) to  corporate reporting in a crisis " concerned with aligning broader social 
norms with corporate action". The invocation of "identity of interests" quoted above can be 
seen as such an alignment. Shell's message is that it is not to be viewed as self-interested, but 
as a force for good: countries which attacked it would be damaging their own national 
interests by losing its support. 
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As shown in Figure 2, it is noticeable that Shell's reporting of employment issues was 
fluctuating and the company declined the opportunity to make regular employee 
disclosures.  The Chairman's statement had consistently contained a word of thanks to the 
company's  employees, but in 1951 Shell also reported on its treatment of employees - “staff 
training has been intensified, and new training facilities are constantly being added in order to 
ensure that this policy is implemented as soon as fully as possible” (Shell 1951 annual report, 
p.13). It was "aiming to achieve the highest standards of technical proficiency... the highest 
service that can be rendered is for a man to fit himself in every way to engage in skilled 
industry” (Shell 1951 annual report, p.13). It stressed that its purpose was  to “be in the 
forefront of employers in every country where it operates  (emphasis added) and endeavour is 
made to cultivate an attitude of understanding towards the employee and a human approach 
to his problems at every level of management” (Shell 1951 annual report, p.13).   
Shell's reports throughout the period were shorter than BP's and showed less variation in 
length- between 14 and 16 pages- with  no use of graphics. There was, though, evidence of 
corporate response to a crisis. Shell's 1950 report had appeared on 5 June 1951 which was 
very shortly after the outbreak of the Iran crisis and too soon for the company to comment on 
it there. But in its 1951 report Shell stressed that "all members of the industry" recognised the 
seriousness of the Iranian situation: "Failure on the part of Governments to respect solemn 
obligations is a new phenomenon which must reflect disastrously on those who practise it” 
(Shell 1951 annual report, p.14).  
What the two companies had in common in their disclosures was the emphasis on the 
justification of their behaviour. For BP, this was specific to the dispute with Iran: they were 
fully supported by the British Government, whilst the Iranians, BP claimed, had brought a 
totally fabricated case against them. For Shell, this was more general: its argument was that 
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its operations produced benefits, and that any breach of the agreements made with host 
governments was potentially dangerous to international welfare.  
Comparative disclosures during Suez crisis (1956-1957) 
BP disclosures during Suez crisis 
With the Suez crisis, there were extensive disruptions in the company’s operations because of 
governmental restrictions that had negative consequences on the performance of BP and 
Shell. No single group was more affected by closure of the Suez Canal and the “damage in 
Syria to the pipeline system to the East Mediterranean than BP, with its big producing 
interests in the Middle East and its large marketing interests in Europe”. BP had the largest 
stake in the Middle East of all British oil companies, which accounted for 99% of production 
vs. e.g. Shell's 13% (Financial Times May 8, 195 7).  Furthermore, with the Suez Crisis in 
1956, the loss of petroleum products created serious logistical problems, clearly Western 
Europe needed larger tankers. As shown in Figure 1, Suez pervaded BP's1956 report, despite 
the Chairman, Gass's, attempts to play it down. Suez was described as "essentially" a 
transport problem on the long voyage round the Cape. Gass stressed that it had coped - 
"measures adopted were effective in dealing with the emergency" (BP 1956 annual report, 
p.16). Furthermore, the beginning of 1957 had been "difficult" with a "reduction" of trade, 
and a slowdown of European consumption, but still: "we can look forward to an expanding 
business granted the stable conditions requisite for the progressive development of Middle 
Eastern oil-production on which the economic future of the producing countries in that area 
so largely depends" (BP 1957 annual report, p.16).   
In reference to employment-issue disclosures, BP engaged in its 1956 report with 
Egyptianization and emphasised that it “would spare no effort to ensure a good standard of 
life” for employees wherever they worked, with "every incentive and opportunity for training 
and advancement in technical and administrative responsibility" (BP 1956 annual report, p. 
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40). The company also stressed that its “marked success (was) being achieved in under-
developed territories (emphasis added) in training adults with no previous industrial 
experience and young commercial and trade apprentices” (BP 1956 annual report, p.40). The 
1957 report emphasised its contribution by stating that it intended to “continue to devote 
particular attention to the training and advancement of nationals in the countries in which (it) 
operate…much emphasis on internationalising (its) training” (BP 1957 annual report, p. 43). 
Also, BP stressed that it sent its British staff abroad, and had overseas staff working in the 
UK: “this is of direct value to us as an international group and also contributes to the general 
cause of international understanding” (BP 1957 annual report, p.43).  
BP's 1956 Annual Report was different from that of the previous year in a number of 
respects. It was much longer - 40 pages compared with 28- and much of the difference was 
made up by a substantial increase in graphics.  There were six pages of maps, comparing oil 
transport routes, and showing worldwide production, exploration, refineries, and marketing 
areas. There were 10 photographs, in total, showing company activities - a refinery, service 
station, laboratories, tanker etc. The effect was to show that BP was an international 
operation, despite its dependence on the Middle East for oil supplies.  
Figure 3 shows that BP's graphical and photographic presentation within the reports reached 
its peak of 15 pages during the Suez crisis.. For instance, Gass, explained in 1955 annual 
report that there had been a "problem" with "retarding effects in the last 2 months of 1956, 
"essentially" a transport problem on the long voyage round the Cape. However, Gass was 
aware that stockholder will be concerned with the consequences of the Suez crisis on BP's 
performance so he said that the results of 1956 represented “a fabulous story of progress” (BP 
1956 annual report, p.16).   
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The 1957 Annual Report was again longer, this time 48 pages, with 11 photographs. Its 
discussion of Suez was more explicit than that of 1956. Suez was no longer a “problem” but a 
“crisis” with “adverse effects” (BP 1957 annual report, p.17) and now the oil industry was in 
a period of “imbalance”. Major investments were being made in facilities for production, 
refinement, transport and delivery,  but “a combination of various factors” had resulted in a 
slowing down of “the growth of consumption", resulting in lower prices and "deteriorated 
trading conditions” Although “difficult” trading was likely to continue, this “should be 
regarded as a phase of adjustment”. Oil still had “important and expanding" contribution to 
make to energy supplies (BP 1957 annual report, p.17). It was disclosed in the 1957 report 
that BP's Middle East oil production was now “huge” -200 million tons per annum -  and 
“given stable conditions to permit the free flow of international trade, (was) confidently 
expected to continue to increase” (BP 1957 annual report, p.18). Under 50/50 arrangements 
with the operating companies, the Governments of host countries “benefit from very large 
revenues, now at a rate nearing £450 million per annum” (BP 1957 annual report, p.18). BP 
stressed this benefit – “it is not always realised” that oil companies “have to reinvest most of 
their share” in development of facilities for production (BP 1957 annual report, p.18).  
 
Shell disclosures during Suez crisis 
Figure 1 shows Shell's reference to the Suez crisis in its annual reports reached its peak of 3 
pages in 1956 but in the 1956 report, Shell's reaction to events recognised their potential 
dangers. Allusions to Suez pervaded the text. Events had been “as important and also as 
striking” as any since the end of WW2 (Shell 1956 annual report, p.11).  Suez had brought 
about “confusion” that made the company defer capital expenditure: it might have “serious 
economic consequences” (Shell 1956 annual report, p.11). Shell stressed at length the ability 
of the oil industry to react appropriately in order to prevent the disastrous loss of oil supplies 
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to the West, by efficient use of the limited tanker tonnage available, by intra-industry 
collaboration and by working with government both in Europe and the USA.  The overall 
message was that the industry in general, and Shell in particular, could respond quickly and 
effectively to crisis, in order to protect public needs.  
In the 1957 report, there was much less reference to Suez. As noted earlier, Shell was less 
dependent than BP on Middle Eastern oil and so had less need to account for results that had 
suffered from the crisis. What had affected it in 1957 was the combination of increased oil 
supplies at a period of reduced demand in Europe. It addressed these by describing renewed 
supplies as evidence of “making good” after the Suez damage (Shell 1957 annual report, 
p.13). The current situation might be damaging for profit levels, but the company was “able 
to withstand...such events, because of the strength derived not only from its past investment 
policies but from the widespread nature of its resources and interests” (Shell 1957 annual 
report, p.14). Shell could “increase its volume of supply at need- as has been demonstrated by 
recent events” (Shell 1957 annual report, p.14).  The report's theme was that the Suez 
experience had demonstrated the company's strength and flexibility.  
Shell's 1956 report had extensive disclosure about its contribution to international welfare. 
The chairman's statement included lengthy praises of the company's recruitment practices. 
Shell “intend(ed) to continue the practice ...have assiduously and successfully pursued in the 
past, of drawing our personnel from every nation in which we operate and training each one 
individually in those aspects of our operations most appropriate to his ability” (Shell 1956 
annual report, p.16). He also asserted that "it is one of the great advantages of the Group's 
international character that (staff) training and career development need not be bounded by 
any one country and increasing use is being made of that facility. In this way (they) shall 
remain well equipped to meet the changes which are taking place in many parts of the world 
in the political and technical scenes, and at the same time (they) shall increase (their) 
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effective communication between country and country and between man and man on the 
exchange of progressive ideas" (Shell 1956 annual report, p.16). The emphasis was again on 
Shell as a reliable international operation, and also on its contribution to worldwide progress - 
note the reference above to "progressive ideas" and the ability to "meet the changes". 
Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2013, p.6) as discussed above, identify "reputation" and "image" 
as two of the possible beneficiaries of IM. Shell's reporting in the Suez period had 
implications for both. It presented itself as both an employer who could offer benefits to local 
workers and also as part of a movement of worldwide progress and development which 
should be welcomed by host countries. 
In a nutshell, in attempting to synthesise an explanation for disclosure changes in the case of 
this longitudinal study of BP and Shell during the period 1950-58, there are three 
observations to be made. Firstly, as shown in Figure 1, BP and Shell disclosures increased 
and reached their peak during both crises. However, it is worth adding that BP's disclosures 
in the reports were more than Shell in terms of total page proportions disclosed in the annual 
reports.  BP needed to impress and maintain stakeholders confidence to maintain share price 
in order to attract new finance as and when needed (e.g. to expand tanker fleet). Furthermore, 
BP needed to maintain its status because it was smaller and less internationally known than 
Shell. Also, BP needed to demonstrate control despite dependence on precarious Middle East 
oil supplies. Secondly, as shown in Figure 2, BP and Shell disclosures on employment-issues 
increased during crises as the companies engage more with its employees and acknowledge 
their performance. Again, as on general disclosures, BP's disclosures on employee related 
issues in the reports were more than Shell in terms of total page proportions disclosed in the 
annual reports. Finally, as shown in Figure 3 , there was a substantial increase in the length 
and physical and aesthetic presentation of BP reports especially during crisis.  
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 5 Conclusion 
The introduction to this paper identified a number of key aspects of discretionary accounting 
narratives: they are qualitative, they are distinct from legally required information, and they 
appear in a variety of media: within financial reports, in the chairman's AGM statements and 
in press releases. They may include graphic material as well as text, and they are addressed to 
a variety of audiences. The purpose of such narratives has been queried, and two distinct 
roles are identified. Narrative reporting may be seen as incremental information (II) intended 
to keep users aware of corporate behaviour, or as impression management (IM) which is 
deployed by the company to defend itself against social, political and economic criticism or 
to retain its power.  
Our examination of Shell and BP corporate disclosure at periods of crisis offers the chance to 
examine the deployment of narrative by two companies, in the same industry but differently 
affected by events. BP was more directly affected than Shell, because of its reliance on 
Iranian resources and its need for access to the Eastern hemisphere. Shell was not hit in the 
same way, but could see, in 1950/51 and in 1956/7, potential threats to all oil companies if 
the countries where they operated began to demand more from them and from their 
governments.  
Our findings suggest that these different concerns are reflected in the companies' reporting. 
BP's priorities in Iran were to defend its reputation as an oil extractor contracting with the 
government, and as an employer of Iranian labour, and also to present itself as a confident, 
growing operation even when deprived of access to its major assets in Iran. During the Suez 
crisis, the company did not have the same need to defend its operations in Egypt against local 
criticism. Nasser's action was directed against Western governments rather than the 
behaviour of individual companies.  But BP once more saw its market reputation in peril, 
given its dependence on the Eastern hemisphere for oil supplies. 
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Shell was not directly threatened by Iran, and its diverse operations meant that it suffered less 
from the Suez closure. But Iran and Suez were both warnings that all oil companies might be 
at the mercy of the states where they operated. In its narrative reporting, Shell defended its 
"identity of interests" with host governments worldwide, and stressed the contribution that it, 
in common with other oil companies, was making to world progress.  
Graphic material does not feature in Shell's reports, either before or during the periods of 
crisis. It does, though, have an important role for BP. There is a major increase in the amount 
of graphics used during each of the crises, and in particular in photographs of the company’s 
activities. The pictures of BP in action support the claims made in the text that it is a healthy 
and growing operation, buoyed up by a diverse set of operations -they are, as Campbell et al. 
(2009) point out, a key part of the company's "rhetoric". 
At the beginning of the paper, we suggested that this study has the potential to make two 
contributions – to examine the use of narrative reporting at an earlier period than has been 
considered by current studies, and to clarify the distinction between  the characteristics of IM 
and II reporting. We conclude that both companies did indeed make use of narrative 
reporting.  
Should this reporting be seen as II or IM? To answer this question we need to be able to make 
a clear distinction between the two objectives: to keep investors aware of key events and to 
defend the company against challenges and criticisms. Such a distinction is not easy to 
achieve. The same kind of information may be directed to investors simply to update them of 
events, or to reassure them of the company’s good intentions and secure status, and the same 
issues may be of interest for a number of different stakeholders.  In concluding that the two 
companies have used narrative for IM rather than II in this period, we suggest that certain key 
aspects need to be considered. 
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One of these is the scope of the narrative that each company released. For BP, Iran and Suez 
were crises with more immediate and significant impacts than they were for Shell, and as a 
result, BP's response was more detailed and diverse. The company countered its critics by 
producing a long and detailed response to the Iranian government's charges. It also 
emphasised its own virtues as an employer.  It reacted to the apparent dangers of Suez by 
proclaiming its financial health and stability. Shell recognised the general risks of hostility, 
which oil companies might meet in the Western as well as the Eastern hemisphere, and its 
rhetoric defended the industry from claims of host country exploitation.  The choice of 
detailed or general argument suggests that each company was considering its specific needs 
rather than addressing the same topics year on year. 
The timing of disclosure is also significant.  The reports do not show a regular, unchanging 
flow of material. In the years of crisis, the companies addressed relevant themes, which 
generally resulted in longer reports:  before and after the crises, as tabulated in Appendix 2, 
they used less text and BP fewer graphic. BP's lengthy and detailed report for 1950 was 
substantially delayed. These are all features which suggest IM motives, the adaptation of 
reporting to particular circumstances. 
Another factor in distinguishing between IM and II is the audience to whom the reports are 
addressed. Plainly, investors could gain relevant information about operations from e.g. BP's 
coverage of its developments and new activities, and to this extent the reports were II. There 
are features though which, we argue, are more relevant to an IM interpretation. One is the 
timing of the "incremental" reporting about activities. It was, as noted above, not part of a 
steady flow, but appeared in large quantity at a time of crisis and then stopped as the crisis 
was resolved. 
Another distinguishing feature of  the II and IM objectives is the reports' coverage of the 
relationship with governments in Iran, Egypt and the other countries whose support they 
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needed. This may have been addressed to these governments, but there were other forums for 
more extensive arguments and more direct contact between companies and governments. 
(See for instance Abdelrehim et al. 2011 on contacts and negotiations between BP and Iran 
before nationalisation). The choice of medium - reports and AGMs - suggests strongly that 
the companies were aiming to state their case to the "home" audience. This included the 
investors who attended meetings and read financial statements. BP needed to maintain 
shareholder confidence, and a report that showed it as justified in its behaviour was an 
important asset. However, it was not, we argue "incremental information" for investors: it 
was a rhetorical attempt to regain and maintain their confidence. 
And the audience included also the politicians and the general public whose support was 
needed at moments of stress.  The companies needed government endorsement in resisting 
nationalisation. The reported detail of BP's history of contracts with Iran was helpful in 
making the British case that it was a trustworthy partner. Political support could also be 
enlisted by the companies’ invocation of global wellbeing. This was the function, for 
instance, of BP's claim that its work furthered "international understanding” (BP 1957 annual 
report, p.43) and Shell's of "an attitude of understanding towards the employee" (Shell 1951 
annual report, p.13). These reports that the companies endorsed universal values could make 
them attractive to the electorate, justifying home governments in offering them political 
support.  
There is, we recognise, scope for an objection to the IM/II analysis - that it is based on a 
distinction that in practice is more tenuous than our analysis has suggested. It can be argued 
that the production of certain kinds of information at particular moments is a valid strategy, 
which is not intended to mislead or bias. For instance, a company which is abruptly exposed 
to a threat to its historically strong market may stress in its report that it has access to other 
developing markets, the ability to develop new products, and other strategies that will allow it 
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to recover and survive. Having survived the threat, the company may not devote space in its 
report to these topics. Has it made the disclosure choices as a tactic to "manage" information, 
or simply because it is telling users what it is relevant for them to know? When the historic 
market is threatened, it will be helpful for users to base their decisions on a full overview of 
the company’s potential markets: when markets are not a key concern, users will not benefit 
from coverage of the issue. Certainly, this view provides an alternative way of understanding 
the disclosure pattern explored in this paper: that it is about relevance to users, not about 
corporate strategy. Shell and BP, on this reading, were managing information, not 
impressions, with the aim of giving users the data that would be helpful to them at a 
particular moment. An unselective approach - copious data about matters that are not of 
current concern - would be less useful for the reader, so that the corporate decision was 
needed for the sake of relevance. 
We acknowledge this challenge- that the pattern we have identified may be a reflection of the 
companies' wish to produce relevant reports, and the IM/II contrast we make is potentially 
too clear-cut. It is a distinction that has attracted growing attention in recent years, evidenced 
by studies of companies using narrative reporting to defend themselves or enhance their 
status.  
 
There is scope for further historical investigation of the phenomenon, to gain an 
understanding of the ways in which it has been used to ensure and enhance corporate status. 
Recent studies which have dealt with the deployment of CSR to meet criticism on social and 
environment grounds have pointed to the use of IM via selective style and content. We argue 
that the Shell and BP reports analysed above are an early example of the same behaviour. The 
challenges faced by the two companies were those of political crises. We suggest that they 
recognised the value of impression management in countering criticism, to reassure investors, 
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to justify themselves and to underwrite the policy of Western governments. There is scope for 
further historical investigation of the role played by narrative reporting in serving these aims. 
Such studies might, as here, choose paired subjects to analyse the extent to which there are 
different modes of responding to similar challenges, and the reasons for the approaches 
selected. It will also be valuable to look across a number of companies in a similar industry 
worldwide, as appropriate, to arrive at a better understanding of the pressures within and 
outside companies that shape their reporting behaviour at times of emergency. And moving 
on from episodes of crisis to longer historical periods: do disclosures map on to investors" 
needs, or is there further evidence that they can be related to corporate objectives in 
defending their images and interests? 
  
32 
 
Appendix 1 
The two companies went through a number of changes in name and structure over the 
twentieth century. These are summarised below: 
Companies’ origins date back to the founding of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909, 
established as a subsidiary of Burmah Oil Company to exploit oil discoveries in Iran. In 
1935, it became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and in 1954 British Petroleum. British 
Petroleum acquired majority control of Standard Oil of Ohio in 1978. Formerly majority 
state-owned, the British government privatised the company in stages between 1979 and 
1987. British Petroleum merged with Amoco in 1998 and acquired ARCO and Burmah 
Castrol in 2000.  
The Royal Dutch Shell Group was created in February 1907 through the merger of two rival 
companies - Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and the Shell Transport and Trading 
Company Ltd of the United Kingdom. The terms of the merger gave 60% ownership of the 
new Group to the Dutch arm and 40% to the British. It was not long before the company left 
its naturalist roots far behind. Initially the Company commissioned eight oil tankers for the 
purposes of transporting oil. In 1919, Shell took control of the Mexican Eagle Petroleum 
Company and in 1921 formed Shell-Mex Limited which marketed products under the 
Shell and Eagle brands in the United Kingdom. In 1932, partly in response to the difficult 
economic conditions of the times, Shell-Mex merged its UK marketing operations with those 
of British Petroleum to create Shell-Mex and BP, a company that traded until the brands 
separated in 1975.  
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Appendix 2  
Effect of crises on disclosure by page length and topics 
BP and Iran 
Date Number of pages 
of report  in total 
Pages of references 
to Iranian situation 
Number of 
pages of 
graphics 
Pages with references 
to its treatment of 
employees  
1950 30 11 1 photo 1 
1951 33 2 ½ 13 in total 
Divided as 
follows 
2 maps 
1 ½ pages 
of  bar charts 
9 ½ photos 
¼ 
1952 28 2 ½ 8 in total 
Divided as 
follows 
1 bar chart 
7 photos 
¼ 
1953 28 2 ½ 2 photos ¼ 
1954 24 0 0 ¼ 
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BP and Suez 
Date Number of pages 
of report in total 
Pages of references 
to Suez situation 
Number of 
pages of 
graphics 
Pages of references to 
its treatment of 
employees 
1955 28 0 2 graphs ¼ 
1956 40 3 14 in total 
Divided as 
follows 
1 bar chart 
3 maps 
10 photos 
1 
1957 44 3 15 in total 
Divided as 
follows: 
4 graphs 
11 photos 
½ 
1958 42 0 12 in total 
Divided as 
follows: 
2 graphs 
2 maps 
8 photos 
 
¼ 
 
 
Shell and Iran 
Date Number of pages 
of report  in total 
Pages of references 
to Iranian situation 
Number of 
pages of 
graphics 
Pages of references to 
its treatment of 
employees 
1950 15 0 0 ¼ 
1951 15 3 0 ½ 
1952 14 0 0 0 
1953 16 0 0 ¼ 
1954 16 0 0 ¼ 
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Shell and Suez 
Date Number of pages 
of report in total 
Pages of references 
to Suez situation 
Number of 
pages of 
graphics 
Pages of references to 
its treatment of 
employees 
1955 13 0 0 ¼ 
1956 16 3 0 ½ 
1957 15 1 0 0 
1958 17 0 0 ¼ 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Figure 1 - Reference of BP and Shell to crisis 
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Figure 2- Employment-issues disclosure for BP and Shell  
 
 
     
 
 
Figure 3- Appearance of graphics in BP and Shell reports 
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